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ADMIRAL RICHARD G. COLBERT
Pioneer in Building Global Maritime Partnerships
John B. Hattendorf
Most people who serve in navies or devote their days to writing and thinkingabout naval power take almost for granted the concept that navies are an ex-
pression of national power and therefore, in modern terminology, reinforce na-
tionalism. We have become almost hypnotized by the idea that there is a
continuum from national policy to naval strategy and tactics. Indeed, that is one
powerful thought that lies at the foundation of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings
and Sir Julian Corbett’s analysis. Yet it is not the only way to view the matter.
Mahan and William S. Sims in the U.S. Navy of the early twentieth century had
thought about possibilities for an Anglo-American
maritime alliance. But there is an even older thought:
the idea that there is an essential commonality among
those who go down to the sea in ships. Richard Colbert
has been one of a very few senior admirals in the U.S.
Navy to champion this other view. At the first Interna-
tional Seapower Symposium, in 1969, an occasion that
brought together for the first time many heads of
free-world navies, Colbert outlined his own view:
The experience of this conference has strongly confirmed
what all of us already knew by instinct and experience:
that the common aspects of so many of the problems we
each face in operating at sea creates a strong fraternal
bond. This unites all of us in blue suits who share similar
professional concerns.
Professor Hattendorf, chairman of the Naval War Col-
lege’s Maritime History Department, has served since
1984 as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Mari-
time History. He earned his master’s degree in history
from Brown University in 1971 and his doctorate in war
history from the University of Oxford in 1979. From
1988 to 2003 he directed the Advanced Research De-
partment in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He
is the author of numerous articles and author, coauthor,
editor, or coeditor of forty books on maritime history,
including The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime
Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004); U.S.
Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents,
Newport Paper 27 (2006); U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30
(2007); and the prizewinning Oxford Encyclopedia of
Maritime History (2007).
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We recognize that there are political problems and interests which sometimes limit
our co-operation. But it is equally clear that the broad interests of the world commu-
nity we serve are enhanced by bringing our common perspective to bear on common
problems. Much can be done on a Navy-to-Navy basis.1
An acquaintance of Colbert’s in the Italian Navy defined the concept even
more sharply when he wrote, “Probably the underlying philosophy lies in the
idea of considering navies of the world as a social system to a degree separated or
divorced from the states they defend.”2 In other words, it is possible to discern a
kind of global brotherhood of naval officers, indoctrinated with a concept of in-
ternational naval cooperation and nurtured by close, personal relations.
In a sense it seems an idealistic concept, founded on a belief in peace and
friendship on a global scale that should be the basis for all human relations.3 Yet
at the same time, Colbert’s notion can be viewed as a realistic, pragmatic strategy
for the free world as the United States and its allies faced Soviet naval power.4 As
some of his contemporaries noted, Colbert was not a theoretician given to work-
ing out new concepts in abstract form, but once someone else had formed a con-
cept, he was superb at developing it further and bringing it to fruition.5 It is in
this sense that Colbert was accurately described in an honorary degree citation
as “Sailor-Statesman of the Navy, creator, innovator, educator.”6
In the thirty-six years of his naval career, Colbert slowly but increasingly be-
came interested in concepts and ideas relating to international naval coopera-
tion. By the time of his death in 1973 he had reached the rank of full admiral and
had truly earned the title that Admiral Elmo Zumwalt gave him: “Mr. Interna-
tional Navy.”7
EARLY CAREER
Colbert came from an unusual family background. He was born in Brownsville,
Pennsylvania, on 12 February 1915, the son of Charles F. Colbert, Jr., and Mary
Louis Benford Colbert. His father, a prominent leader in the coke, coal, and alloy
business, was president of the Pittsburgh Metallurgical Company. Colbert at-
tended Shady Side Academy, an established college preparatory school in Pitts-
burgh. During his years there he developed a passionate desire to become a naval
officer, despite his father’s fond hope that he would join the family business.
Young Colbert decided to test out his desire and, with his father’s help, obtained
a berth on board the steamship Robert Luckenbach for the summer of 1931, on a
voyage from New York to Seattle and back via the Panama Canal. It was an
eventful trip that gave Colbert the experience of a hurricane and of hard work
at sea. At the end of it, having firmly established his love for ships and the sea,
the sixteen-year-old boy wrote in his diary, “I can honestly say I have never
enjoyed a summer as much as this one.”8
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After proving himself at sea, the next hurdle was to obtain an appointment to
the Naval Academy following his graduation from school in June 1933. It was no
easy task. Starting more than a year in advance, his father began writing letters to
friends, business associates, local politicians, and his congressman asking their
help. Disappointingly, they all replied that no appointments were available that
had not already been promised to other, equally good candidates.9 Finally, in
desperation, a friend of the family and the chancellor of Syracuse University,
Charles W. Flint, wrote to President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt asking his assis-
tance. Roosevelt gave Flint the formula that eventually won the boy his
commission.
“The only chance for young Colbert,” Roosevelt wrote, “is to find some other
Congressman or Senator who has a vacancy and who would be willing to have
him move into the district or state in which the vacancy exists for the purpose of
establishing a residence there, even though it be a temporary one.”10 In the end,
Colbert did not have to look too far afield. Congressman Harry A. Estrep of
Pennsylvania’s Thirty-fifth District appointed Colbert to the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy in the class of 1937. This early incident is illuminating because it reveals the
Colbert family’s ease in approaching influential people, a skill that Richard
Colbert often used later in life.
Colbert was a Naval Academy midshipman from 1933 to 1937; his class
started with 440 and graduated 331. On graduation, he stood only 247 in the
class. He was neither a great scholar nor an athlete, but he clearly stood out as a
leader and as someone well trained in the social graces. He commanded the 3rd
Battalion of midshipmen in the first third of his senior year and again for the fi-
nal third of the year, when the best and most successful leaders of the class were
chosen. Throughout his academy years he was busy in extracurricular activities,
particularly social ones. On one occasion during the Midshipman’s Practice
Cruise in 1936, Colbert was selected from among the other midshipmen on
board the flagship USS Arkansas to receive distinguished civilian guests. “I seem
to be getting a name for being a Majordomo,” he wrote to his father.11 Indeed, he
served on the hop committee and the Christmas card committee, was codirector
of the musical clubs show, and finally, served as chairman of the most important
social event of his four years at Annapolis, the Ring Dance.12 Those experiences
and social training helped Colbert develop his approach and style, so important
later in his life.
While social events were prominent, one can find even in his midshipman
days the first traces of his interest in foreign affairs.13 He reflected this in a speech
he prepared for the academy’s public-speaking group, the Quarterdeck Society,
in January 1935. The prizewinning speech, entitled “The War Peril,” reflected for
the first time Colbert’s appreciation of foreign opinion. In his speech, he
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declared that there was one great overwhelming fear in Europe, the fear of a war
that, no matter where it started, would spread and destroy the Western world.
“America cannot afford to be indifferent to this universal opinion of Europe,”
Colbert concluded.14 It was a thought that echoed throughout his career.
Upon graduation from Annapolis in June 1937, Colbert went to his first sea
assignment, the commissioning crew of the new aircraft carrier USS Yorktown.
In 1939, he was reassigned, this time to the Asiatic Fleet, where he received or-
ders to the flush-deck four-piper USS Barker. Colbert served in Barker for five
years, rising from junior ensign to lieutenant commander and commanding of-
ficer. The ship saw duty in Southeast Asian and Australian waters as well as es-
cort duty in the Atlantic and as part of the carrier USS Core’s successful
hunter-killer group. His years in Barker brought him the first experience of co-
operation with other navies. In early 1942, Barker was one of the ships in
ABDA-FLOAT (American-British-Dutch-Australian), the Allied naval com-
mand under Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN, and later under Vice-Admiral C. E. L.
Helfrich, Royal Netherlands Navy. Barker served in the striking force along with
British, Dutch, and Australian ships in the unsuccessful attempts to intercept the
Japanese invasion fleet off Bali and Bangka Island in February 1942. The experi-
ence of those actions impressed Colbert, who was then the ship’s communica-
tions officer. Despite the current view of historians who see the Java Sea
campaign as a mismanaged affair, Colbert often discussed with his colleagues
how relatively smoothly he believed the ship-to-ship communications between
ships of different navies had functioned in that critical situation.15
Despite the defeat of the ABDA command, Colbert’s memory of his experi-
ence stayed with him and convinced him not only of the practicality of multina-
tional forces but also of the real advantage that multinational arrangements had
for securing the seas. Looking back in 1966, he argued against those who wished
to replace NATO with a series of bilateral treaties, saying that such treaties had
not worked in “slow-motion” wars such as the Second World War. They could
not be responsive to the complex, fast-moving events that could lead to nuclear
war. Thinking of the events leading up to the Second World War naval engage-
ments in the Dutch East Indies, Colbert commented that those were “desperate
times, and I saw this lesson first hand. It was a bitter lesson.”16 Through that ex-
perience, Colbert came to believe that there was greater potential for success
through the combined efforts of many nations than through following only the
individual interests of single nations.
From Barker, Colbert went on to command the destroyer Meade in both the
Atlantic and the Pacific, remaining in command until the end of the war. Pro-
moted to commander, Colbert was assigned after the war to the Bureau of Naval
Personnel, where he worked on plans for the postwar naval reserve. During that
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period, he also served as a social aide in the Truman White House. He kept up his
interest in foreign affairs through membership in the United Nations Club, but
in these years he had not settled down fully to concentrate on international
issues.
MATURATION OF A CONCEPT
The real turning point in Colbert’s career came in 1948, when he was selected as
aide and flag secretary to Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN, Commander in
Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, based in London.
Commenting on his new orders, Colbert told a friend, “Am not sure whether I
like it or not. I guess I will find out.”17 He did like it, and Conolly’s ideas and ap-
proach came to have a marked influence on Colbert.
Conolly was a superb negotiator, and Colbert accompanied him in meetings
with naval leaders in most of the Western European and Mediterranean nations
and learned much from the way Conolly handled problems and dealt with other
leaders. One incident in particular seemed to summarize Conolly’s approach
and influenced Colbert’s way of thinking. During a cruise in the Mediterranean
on board his flagship in 1949, USS Columbus, Conolly arranged a tabletop war
game in which he posed the problem of an allied naval command in the Mediter-
ranean; it was one of the first steps in the arduous process of creating what
would become the NATO Mediterranean naval command. In order to examine
carefully the issue of whether the command headquarters should be afloat or
ashore and what forces should participate, Conolly gathered senior officers from
a number of countries. Each cooperated but clearly showed his national bias.
Conolly finished the exercise without solutions but made all who participated
feel that they were part of a team dealing with a common problem.18 That was a
theme basic to Richard Colbert’s way of thinking.
By all accounts, Colbert’s association with Conolly provided the basic in-
sight upon which Colbert built his later work. At the same time, there was a
parallel and personal development that helped to shape his international
outlook further. At a New Year’s ball in 1949, Colbert met Prudence Ann
Robertson, daughter of E. J. Robertson, the managing director of Lord
Beaverbrook’s newspapers the London Daily Express, the Evening Standard,
and two Scottish newspapers. A Canadian who had gone to live in London af-
ter the First World War, E. J. Robertson nurtured Colbert’s instinctive feeling
for international cooperation as the most viable means of achieving world
peace, and Colbert returned his interest with admiration and devotion. At
the end of Colbert’s tour of duty in London, he and Prudence Robertson were
married at St. Paul’s Church, Knightsbridge. Throughout their married life,
Colbert felt that England was his second home; at the same time, he learned
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from his wife how to be sensitive to differences in points of view between Eu-
ropeans and North Americans.19
COLBERT IN WASHINGTON
Leaving England in December 1950, Colbert accompanied Admiral Conolly to
his new position as President of the Naval War College, then Colbert moved on
to his own new assignment in the political-military affairs division of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Shortly after Colbert’s arrival, the division received a new director, Rear Ad-
miral Bernard L. Austin. Colbert obviously liked the work in his new assignment
under Austin, much of which was dealing with foreign issues and with people of
other nationalities.20 During this period Admiral Austin became concerned with
the problem of providing instruction for naval officers from nations who
wanted training in the United States. There had already been a move to put ser-
vice education on a more systematized basis through the establishment of the
NATO Defense College in Paris, but this was not sufficient to meet all the de-
mand. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, there were many requests made to the
U.S. Navy for use of its service schools, but no regularized arrangements had
been made. In light of this, Austin directed Colbert to make a staff study of the
best way in which a course could be developed for foreign naval officers.21 This
work was the seed from which much would grow later in Colbert’s career.
While Colbert was at work on this and other projects, he came to the atten-
tion of Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. Sherman selected
Colbert to become his aide later in the year, undoubtedly on Admiral Conolly’s
recommendation. Before that could become a permanent assignment, however,
Sherman needed Colbert as an experienced and knowledgeable aide on tempo-
rary assignment with him for overseas trips. One important assignment came in
1950–51, when Sherman was a member of an interallied committee negotiating
how the new NATO military commands would be structured. After each negoti-
ating session, Sherman would relax with his aides and unwind by discussing the
events of the day. Through this method Sherman taught Colbert about national
sensitivities and current issues as well as successful methods of international
negotiation.22
In July 1951, another issue arose in which Admiral Sherman used Colbert’s
experience and expertise. Some years earlier, while with Admiral Conolly,
Colbert had been closely involved in the staff work leading to the U.S. proposal
for obtaining American naval-base rights in Spain. As early as 1948, Franco had
said that he would make bases available, but President Truman and the National
Security Council had initially rejected the proposal.23 Despite qualms about as-
sociating their country with fascist Spain, Sherman and Conolly, among others,
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believed that NATO’s southern flank would be vulnerable without friendly bases
in Spain. As the only member of the Joint Chiefs to take this view, Sherman
went ahead, having finally persuaded Truman that it was an important strate-
gic issue.24 With Colbert at his side, Sherman traveled to Spain for talks with
Franco, and afterward he filled in the details and the rationale behind all his
agreements in discussion with his aide. Continuing on from Spain to Naples for
further talks with European leaders, Admiral Sherman suddenly died of a heart
attack before he could prepare any written reports of his conversations. Colbert
was the U.S. naval officer with the most thorough knowledge of what Sherman
and Franco had agreed upon, and thereby Colbert became a direct link in the
chain that led to the U.S. Navy’s use of Rota, Spain, as a naval base.25
COLBERT AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Upon completion of his tour of duty in Washington, Commander Colbert re-
ported to the heavy cruiser USS Albany as executive officer. During his two years
on board, Albany served as flagship for Commander, Battleship-Cruiser Force,
Atlantic, and was deployed to the Mediterranean. Colbert distinguished himself
as an exceptionally capable administrator, a good shipmate;26 as one of his com-
manding officers recalled, he was “the best executive officer any ship had had (or
the good fortune to have).”27
Upon completion of his sea duty, Colbert had to choose between assign-
ment as either head of an academic section at the Naval Academy or a student
at the Naval War College. Seeking advice, Colbert wrote to his old boss, Admi-
ral Conolly, who was by then retired. Conolly gave him sound advice that was
to prove remarkably true. “In regard to the possibilities for duty,” Conolly
wrote, “I would say by all means take the Naval War College if you have the op-
portunity. . . . I have always considered it a turning point in a naval career.”28 In
the autumn of 1955, Colbert reported to the Naval War College as a student in
the naval warfare course. Recently promoted to captain, Colbert stayed on for
two more years as a staff member.
The background for Colbert’s new assignment stretched back to the early
1950s, when he had done his staff study on training foreign naval officers under
Admiral Austin in the political-military affairs branch. In 1955–56, the Presi-
dent of the Naval War College was Vice Admiral Lynde McCormick, who had
taken up the College presidency after having been the first Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Atlantic. In this role, McCormick had commanded several NATO exer-
cises, including MAINBRACE, the largest allied peacetime exercise up to that
time. These experiences taught McCormick the fundamental need for develop-
ing better understanding among NATO navies. His experience paralleled that of
Admiral Arleigh Burke.
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During 1955, Burke’s first year as Chief of Naval Operations, he began to lay
the groundwork for closer coordination between the United States and other
NATO navies. At the same time, he saw the need for similar coordination with
friendly navies in Asia, Africa, and throughout the Americas. In addition, he
wanted to create a way in which naval officers from nations that had fought
against the United States during the Second World War could shed their unspo-
ken sense of inferiority following defeat and become full-fledged allies.
One of the options Burke saw was the chance to offer a year’s study at the Na-
val War College, modeled upon the lines of the curriculum already in place for
the first year of the naval warfare course. Burke made contact with the leaders of
several allied navies, who were generally enthusiastic about this idea. By the
spring of 1956, twenty-three navies had accepted Burke’s invitation, with Admi-
ral McCormick’s full cooperation in implementing the course at the Naval War
College.
At the time these plans were coming to fruition, Colbert was just finishing his
first year as a student in the naval warfare course. When Burke selected Colbert
to head up the new course, there was some jealousy on the part of others at the
College. But Burke had full confidence in Colbert, having known him while he
was in the political-military affairs division, where his office had been directly
across the hall from Burke’s.29
Colbert’s first task was to choose a name for the course. He was firmly op-
posed to the idea of using the word “foreign” in the name, wanting instead to se-
lect a name that would reflect a positive and mutual goal. After about a month,
he selected the name “Naval Command Course for Free World Naval Officers.”30
The purpose of the course was multifaceted. Basically it was to prepare offi-
cers for higher command responsibilities within their own navies while at the
same time familiarizing them with U.S. Navy doctrines, methods, and practices.
But its purpose was much broader than that, as Professor August Miller reflected
after his first year’s experience under Colbert’s direction:
At the Naval War College in an atmosphere of complete freedom of thought and ex-
pression, the foreign officers both symbolize and interpret their own navies and their
countries not only to Americans but to each other; and on the basis of this free in-
quiry it can be readily recognized that such an open exchange of ideas will help to al-
low friendly nations to cooperate with one another in maximum efficiency in time of
world stress.31
Colbert himself was well satisfied with the course and privately wrote to a
friend, “All goes well—almost too smoothly. The capability of the students is far
beyond our expectations—they really look like the ‘future CNO’s [Chiefs of Na-
val Operations] of the Free World’ as Admiral Burke describes them.”32
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Colbert took great pains with the course, designing an appropriate curricu-
lum and nurturing close personal contacts among the students. The social side
of the course was an essential element, and the Colberts spent a large sum of
their own money to ensure that all went well, not only with cocktail parties but
also with flowers for sick family members or small farewell gifts. For all of this,
Burke consistently gave Colbert full credit for the course’s success. As he wrote to
Colbert privately a decade later, “The idea was good, but a lot of good ideas come
a cropper, and this one did not, because of you. You were the man who started it
properly, who nursed it and nurtured it along the proper lines.”33
Yet in this period, Colbert’s ideas were very much in the process of develop-
ment. The experience of being the director of the Naval Command Course for its
first two classes very clearly became the foundation upon which his later career
was built. At this stage, however, he did not seem to have a clear vision of what
could practicably be done with the cooperation he was then nurturing.
EXPERIENCE IN INTERALLIED AND INTERAGENCY NAVAL
ASSIGNMENTS
After three years at the Naval War College, Colbert left for Washington, where he
was assigned to the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Long Range Plans and
Basic War Plans Branch. In 1960, Colbert became commanding officer of the
Sixth Fleet’s general stores ship USS Altair, based in Barcelona, Spain. This
proved a formative and influential phase of his career, which reinforced some of
his experience with the Naval Command Course. The ship spent much time at
sea in support of the operations of the Sixth Fleet and in developing an early ap-
proach to vertical replenishment at sea by helicopter; Colbert’s experimentation
with this new idea was a major contribution to its use and led to its becoming
standard for ships at sea. While engaged in these operations, Colbert was also in-
tensely concerned with his ship’s relationship to its home port and in developing
cooperation with the Spanish Navy. This, he thought, was a key element in the
alliance system.
When word reached him that the very small U.S. naval facility at Barcelona
might be abolished and the fleet supported by a more “cost-effective,” larger
base, Colbert objected strongly. His reasoning reflected his growing belief in the
importance of personal relationships across national and cultural boundaries.
He pointed out to his superiors that it was important for the U.S. Navy’s sailors
and their families to develop close relationships with the peoples of the coun-
tries in which their bases were located, through an appreciation and recognition
of their hosts’ customs and ways of life. Altair’s home port in Barcelona gave
such an opportunity. “It would appear,” Colbert wrote, “that every opportunity
should be grasped by the U.S. Navy to establish and maintain more small
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unobtrusive United States representation of this type in friendly countries,
rather than closing them and concentration at installations which already are
criticized as large and conspicuous overseas bases.”34
Colbert was selected for his major command while still in command of Altair.
He had asked for assignment to “a cruiser out of Boston,” and the Bureau of Na-
val Personnel had obliged by giving him command of the guided-missile heavy
cruiser USS Boston. Under Colbert’s command, Boston deployed to the Mediter-
ranean and, for a brief period, served as the flagship for Commander, Sixth Fleet.
Admiral David L. McDonald later recalled that “Colbert and his crew in the
Boston went out of their way to make their ship a most outstanding Flagship.”35
It was while in command of Boston that Colbert decided he wanted to develop
his experience further in political-military affairs. In 1962, Colbert became in-
terested in the possibility of obtaining one of the two military billets on the State
Department’s Policy Planning Council, then headed by Walt W. Rostow. The
council had been established in 1947 by Secretary of State (and General) George
C. Marshall to be a long-range planning and advisory staff whose task would be
to analyze major foreign policy problems. Among its functional responsibilities
the council was particularly charged with coordinating political-military policy
and interagency planning.
Rostow wanted to fill his military billets with the best-qualified officers. Be-
cause he did not want to accept just any officer that the Department of Defense
might assign, Rostow wanted to have a competition that would produce “real
Rhodes Scholarship type of thinking.” During this search, Rostow interviewed
Colbert in November 1962 and later received from him what Rostow described
as “a very moving letter.” Rostow later recalled that Colbert wanted to have the
experience that the Policy Planning Council assignment would give him, but
Colbert was aware that the Navy’s personnel bureau did not think it was good for
his career. However, Colbert persisted in applying, believing that military and
naval officers needed to have a deep knowledge of the problems of diplomacy. In
his letter to Rostow, Colbert remarked that at the Naval War College he had
been closely involved with officers from other countries and that the experi-
ence had had a marked effect on his attitude. Above all, he wanted to build
upon the sense of fraternity that he had experienced.36
In 1962, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul
H. Nitze was particularly interested in getting high-caliber military and naval
officers into other agencies of the government, particularly the State Depart-
ment. A dozen years earlier, Nitze had headed the Policy Planning Council and
knew well its importance and its role. The Navy had never sent an officer to the
Policy Planning Council, but Nitze’s assistant, Captain Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.,
USN, shared Nitze’s view and also wanted to see the Navy increase its influence.
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Both Zumwalt and Nitze believed that an assignment to the State Department
would be career broadening. Colbert too shared this belief, but the detailing offi-
cers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel consistently told him that such an assign-
ment would irreparably damage his career. Colbert’s ability obviously impressed
Rostow, while within the Department of Defense, Zumwalt as Nitze’s aide
“pulled the necessary levers” and got Colbert the assignment he wanted.37
Colbert’s work ranged widely and deeply in foreign policy issues during his two
years with the Policy Planning Council, including work on topics such as multilat-
eral forces, Vietnam, the Inter-American Military Force, a U.S.-Australian squad-
ron, and nuclear arrangements east of Suez in the face of a Chinese communist
nuclear threat.38 The Inter-American Military Force was an idea that specifically
reflected Colbert’s ideas; it was a subject on which he wrote a number of papers.
Colbert had in mind a force that, though primarily naval, included army and air
components. As he visualized it, the force would be of modest size, involving a
few thousand people drawn from seven or eight countries in Latin America,
with U.S. participation limited to no more that 15–20 percent of the total force.
In Colbert’s view “it would be important that the U.S. not be any more than just
a partner in the project.”39 Colbert envisaged that its primary mission would be
ocean surveillance and sea control, but it could also be a peacekeeping force,
thus providing a place for the participation of armies. An important aspect of
this force was its training; significantly, Colbert believed that it would be pro-
vided by the force itself at a base set up in some convenient place in Latin Amer-
ica. This would have an advantage in keeping the force’s training independent of
the United States and in limiting the number of officers who would be brought
into the United States for training.40
In 1964, at the end of his State Department duty, Colbert began to be involved
in developing the concept for the Multilateral Force, a concept that he believed
might be attractive to NATO countries whose navies had surface ships but no
aircraft carriers. Colbert believed it would form a much less costly alternative to
American nuclear submarines, by placing Polaris missiles in merchant ships,
manned by mixed NATO crews with joint responsibility among all NATO na-
tions for nuclear deterrence. This proposal, which implied that the nuclear na-
tions would delegate a certain amount of their sovereignty to an allied
committee, was never implemented.
The idea of mixed manning was tried out, however. Colbert was one of the
small group with Rostow that recommended to Secretary Nitze that the U.S.
Navy demonstrate the feasibility of manning a single ship with officers and men
from different nations. The short-term experiment was successfully carried out
by the USS Claude V. Ricketts in 1964–65.41
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Reflecting on their time together in the State Department, Colbert and his
colleague Colonel Robert N. Ginsburg, USAF, wrote:
To participate in the work of the Council . . . can be an exhilarating experience for
the military man who follows the path and precepts of George C. Marshall. For the
Council’s work is almost daily vindication of the dedicated military officers’ unut-
tered creed. It is not, he knows, the man that is important, nor is it the idea, nor the
military service or branch of government, nor the government itself. It is only the Re-
public and its perpetuation that really matter.42
While Colbert was off in the depths of the State Department, some of his fel-
low officers thought he had been forgotten by the Navy, but it was not so. In May
1964 he was one of five of his class selected for rear admiral. Also, to show the im-
portance of his work, the Navy promoted him while still on the Policy Planning
Council rather than waiting for him to assume his next naval command.
In June 1964, he reported as Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 6, based
at Charleston, South Carolina. The fifty or so ships under his command gave
him the responsibility, as one friend commented, equivalent to the commander
in chief of a smaller navy. A year later, Colbert became deputy chief of staff and
assistant chief of staff for policy, plans, and operations to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Admiral Thomas H. Moorer.
Colbert’s first assignment after he reported to SACLANT was to establish the
Iberian-Atlantic Command. When Moorer became SACLANT in April 1965, he
had pointed out that NATO had agreed several years before to establish a com-
mand covering the sea approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar but that neither the
money nor the men necessary to carry this task out had been authorized. Moorer
told the NATO Military Committee that he wished either to have the directive
canceled or to receive the resources necessary to do the job. The committee
agreed to provide what was needed, and this task, in turn, was given to Colbert.
In short order, Colbert brought IBERLANT (Iberian-Atlantic Command) into
being. In Moorer’s words, “This action not only significantly enhanced the capa-
bility of NATO to deal with naval operations in the area, but also significantly in-
creased the morale, prestige and overall interest of the Portuguese allies. I give
Admiral Colbert all of the credit for this important move.”43
Simultaneously, Colbert began to develop a proposal to create a Standing Na-
val Force, Atlantic. For three years NATO had run an operation called
MATCHMAKER, in which ships of various allied navies joined in an exercise for a
six-month period. In late November 1966, Colbert, as a result of a discussion
with Admiral Moorer, prepared a concept paper that proposed a permanent
MATCHMAKER force that could serve as a naval contingency force for the Allied
Command, Atlantic.44 In May 1967, the NATO Defense Committee agreed in
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principle to establish a standing naval force, and this was approved in a ministe-
rial meeting in December 1967. The force was activated in January 1968. In
Colbert’s view, this was only the beginning. He had already written that
with this as a prototype conceivably we can follow suit with similar forces in time in
the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and very importantly
Latin America. As the Soviet Union continues to expand its sea power world wide, I
can think of no more pragmatic and meaningful counter to their activities than the
United States participating as partners with friendly countries in their various areas.45
In Colbert’s mind, the crisis that led up to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War
would have been the ideal proving ground for a multinational standing naval
force. “If a few of the maritime nations had formed a squadron of destroyers and
contested the closure of the Gulf of Aquaba—perhaps by escorting an Israeli
ship through—in support of the principle of freedom of the seas and Innocent
Passage, the situation there might have been pacified and the Arab-Israeli war,
such as it was, averted for a time or altogether.”46
PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
After the activation of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, and its first visit to the
United States, in the spring of 1968, Colbert was unexpectedly selected to be
President of the Naval War College. Promoted to vice admiral in a sudden jump
over some ten of his classmates, Colbert was delighted to be returning to New-
port. “It is a dream come true—a dream that I would never have mentioned to
anyone, for fear of being precocious,” he remarked.47
As President of the Naval War College Colbert made a remarkable imprint on
the institution. He was largely responsible for implementing new plans to ex-
pand the scope of the College’s academic programs as well as to improve its
physical plant. Like other colleges, the Naval War College had several academic
chairs named for distinguished naval men in specific subject areas. Colbert con-
tinued the policy of that time by inviting distinguished civilian academics to
hold these positions for a short time. He also wanted to increase the number of
academic areas they represented.
In particular, Colbert took special interest in two of the civilian academic
chairs that had been proposed by his senior academic adviser, Professor Freder-
ick H. Hartmann. Colbert’s interest in these particular positions reflected his
deep-seated appreciation for different cultural outlooks. First he brought to fru-
ition the proposals to establish the Claude V. Ricketts Chair of Comparative Cul-
tures. He appointed an anthropologist, John M. Roberts of Cornell University, to
hold this chair in 1969–70.48 Second, and for similar reasons, he supported an
unsuccessful proposal to establish a chair in oriental studies. Explaining his
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view, Colbert wrote, “There are some leading contemporary thinkers who be-
lieve that the twenty-first century will be the Asian Century.” With this increased
awareness of the importance of the Far East in world power politics, economi-
cally, socially, and strategically, such a scholar “would be able to add perspective
to every point on the Asian scene where we as a nation have been and remain
very much involved.”49
Then, after expanding the civilian faculty, he and his staff established a
number of military chairs that were designed to extend the concept of the
civilian academic chairs and ensure that the best-qualified officers in each
area of professional naval interest were brought to the College as instruc-
tors in those areas.
In developing the curriculum, Colbert continued along the lines of his prede-
cessors, but he stressed the historical importance that the Naval War College had
placed on international law since its founding in 1884. In the pages of the Naval
War College Review, Colbert asked rhetorically, “Why should the Naval War Col-
lege alone amongst service colleges, place such emphasis on the study of interna-
tional law?” The answer was obvious to Colbert, for at sea, “international law is
the only law.” But also, “the inter-relationship of legal, political, economic and
social factors which are operative on a global scale and increasing significance of
our international commitments require a clear understanding of the rules gov-
erning the relations between states.”50
In the specific area of international naval cooperation, Colbert took four ma-
jor initiatives at the Naval War College. He established the first of several ex-
change visits between the presidents of the U.S. Naval War College and the Royal
Naval College, Greenwich, supplemented by a week-long visit of forty U.S. Naval
War College students to Greenwich in 1970.51 Second, he proposed the establish-
ment of a Naval Staff Course for middle-grade free-world naval officers, com-
plementing the Naval Command Course but at a lower level and emphasizing
the participation of smaller navies that did not have comparable educational fa-
cilities. Colbert particularly had in mind that this course would primarily de-
velop the professional and managerial skills for the student officers to use in
their own navies, emphasizing the naval decision-making process, naval plan-
ning, and the broad understanding of the roles of sea power. At the same time, it
could familiarize the students with the methods, practices, and doctrines of the
U.S. Navy while developing an international bond among the graduates.52
Third, Colbert built on the long-standing desire of the Naval Command
Course graduates to have a reunion in Newport, combining it with the success-
ful rise of so many of them to flag rank. He wished to use it as a means to create
at the senior flag-officer level “areas of mutual interest, co-ordination, and
co-operation that could pay substantial dividends for the future.”53 The result
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was the International Seapower Symposium of November 1969, the first in a se-
ries of meetings bringing together the chiefs of navies and other naval leaders to
discuss, in an academic setting, current naval issues of mutual concern.54 Out of
the conference came much constructive and valuable thinking that led to the de-
velopment of further regional discussions on the implication of Soviet maritime
expansion. But most important for Colbert, senior naval officers at the confer-
ence became aware of their common outlook. As Canadian vice admiral Harry
Porter wrote to Colbert after the meeting, “I have come away from it with an in-
creased realization of the brotherhood of the sea and comforting knowledge that
most naval officers share the same problems, the same aspirations, and the same
feelings about the importance of sea power on countries and mankind as a
whole.”55
The last of Colbert’s contributions at the Naval War College consisted of proj-
ects that he designed as practical contributions to promote international naval
cooperation. For example, he gave to the students in the Naval Command
Course the mission of designing a “Free World Frigate,” a modern, efficient, and
economical ship of frigate or corvette size. The basic idea in Colbert’s mind was
to have officers from a variety of friendly nations “design” a ship that could pro-
vide the basis for commonality and standardization in multinational naval
forces, such as the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic. Eventually he hoped to see a
squadron of such escort ships with the same hull design, using components for
many nations, each flying a different national flag. The resulting design found
support from key leaders in the United States such as Admirals Elmo
Zumwalt and Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., but nothing came of it. Colbert was deeply
disappointed that it seemed impossible to break down nationalistic barriers
in building warships.56
Colbert’s final effort at the Naval War College was developed from a point in
Zumwalt’s “Project SIXTY,” the action plan for his term as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. Colbert created the detailed plan of action Zumwalt used to persuade al-
lied navies to improve and expand their antisubmarine warfare capabilities, the
better to counter the growing Soviet Navy.57
FINAL ASSIGNMENTS
In June 1971, Colbert left the Naval War College to become chief of staff to the
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. He was delighted with the prospect of
continuing his work with NATO. “It will be like ‘going home,’” he wrote.58 Tak-
ing a circuitous route from Newport to Norfolk, Virginia, Colbert prepared
himself for his new position and laid the groundwork for the second Interna-
tional Seapower Symposium in 1971 by visiting the chiefs of navies in Italy,
Greece, Turkey, Belgium, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Portugal. In
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this Colbert acted as Admiral Zumwalt’s personal representative as well as the
prospective SACLANT chief of staff.59
Later, at the SACLANT headquarters, Colbert was deeply involved in the daily
work of allied naval cooperation. A year later, he was promoted to admiral and
appointed Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. During his fi-
nal years as a NATO officer, both in Norfolk and Naples, Italy, Colbert rounded
out his series of practical initiatives to support international cooperation by rec-
ommending additional multilateral naval forces for the Indian Ocean and the
Mediterranean. Recognizing too the deep expertise needed by naval officers who
work within alliances, Colbert drafted a proposal to establish a NATO postgrad-
uate school to train recently commissioned officers under the guidance of the
NATO international staff.60 Within the U.S. Navy, Colbert recommended that a
NATO career pattern be laid out for selected officers, who would then be fully
aware of NATO procedures, problems, and programs. His plan was rejected, but
too often, he believed, U.S. naval officers came to NATO on short tours of duty
without enough international experience, engrossed in the paths their careers
would take within the U.S. Navy and lacking much of the expertise, knowledge,
and sensitivity to alliance problems that extended experience would have
brought. “Techniques for dealing with foreign personnel require more thought-
fulness, understanding, and patience,” Colbert wrote, characteristically putting
the issue in terms of personal relationships. In an international setting, a tactless
remark displaying insensitivity to another viewpoint, he believed, was often far
more difficult to repair than it would be within a single nation’s staff.61
As Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe in 1972–73,
Colbert’s principal concern was to reduce the tension between Greece and Tur-
key. Under his leadership the Naval On-Call Force, Mediterranean was started
and expanded with the hope of developing it into a standing naval force using
Greek, Turkish, Italian, British, and U.S. ships. Colbert had more success in his
initiatives to develop cooperation between the French Navy and NATO, working
out a treaty allowing annual exercises. Through the combined efforts of Colbert
and French admiral Jean Guillou, a large Franco-American naval exercise took
place off the coast of the United States in 1973.62
During Colbert’s tenure as commander in chief he discovered that he had an
incurable case of cancer, but he remained at his post until a week before his
death, at the age of fifty-eight on 2 December 1973. As Admiral Giuseppe
Pighini, Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe under Colbert, put
it, he was “a man dedicated to his duty till the last breath of life.”63
Colbert’s highest duty, as he saw it, was clearly revealed in a letter he wrote to
Chaplain Henry Duncan, only a few months before he died:
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I am a realist and know that I am on borrowed time. I am convinced that the Lord
has decided to give me some extra time to do some things in this, my last command,
which might better insure a safer world. That is the gist of my prayers. All I ask is just
a bit more time to carry on and establish some concepts—multinational NATO
forces which will strengthen our Free World against what I am convinced is a desper-
ate threat, despite all the talk of detente.64
REFLECTIONS ON A CAREER
Richard Colbert’s entire naval career was developed around a gradually growing
and strengthening commitment to international naval cooperation. He never
worked out or developed his thoughts on this subject in any complete way, but as
one reflects on his various statements and the innovations he made during his
career, one can discern a philosophy that bears much of enduring value. It was a
philosophy grounded in a sense of the need for cooperation, close personal ties,
loyalty, camaraderie, and social grace in day-to-day life. He was a friendly, out-
going man with an understated style—a man who assumed that cordial cooper-
ative behavior was the best way to accomplish things.65 In the life of a career
naval officer, this meant leadership and personal responsibility. Colbert re-
flected these concepts in a letter he wrote near the end of his career to a young of-
ficer just taking up his first command. Referring specifically to Admiral
Zumwalt’s innovative reforms in the U.S. Navy, Colbert advised,
Old Navy or New, long hair or short, it seems to me what ultimately makes the dif-
ference in readiness and effectiveness is the sense of camaraderie and respect that
come from personal involvement and identification on the part of all hands. I fear
that a lot of Navy men never got the underpinning message behind many of the re-
cent innovations: the emphasis on personal responsibility.66
This point was an essential aspect of his philosophy, not only in shipboard
command but also in forming bonds with other countries and other navies. The
key was personal responsibility and, through it, personal relationships. In open-
ing the first International Seapower Symposium, he stressed “the pure profes-
sional naval competence which each of us can bring . . . [to] provide threads of a
cloth which might well be woven into a durable and serviceable fabric.”67
Colbert believed that the highest professional naval competence arises from
two equally important sources: practical experience and war college education.
“War colleges have always been the storehouses of the military arts,” Colbert
said, “but nowadays they must prepare officers to function outside the confines
of purely operational expertise, in an era of transition, of apparent detente, of
new structuring of international politics.”68
The international courses played an essential role in this. Colbert believed
that such courses stressed the “undiluted, the small, close, intimate nature” of
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the relationship built during a year’s study together.69 It was nothing that could
be mass produced but was created slowly and surely over time by a delicate for-
mula: a small group, one officer only from each country, interacting with the en-
tire group of carefully selected students and well-chosen staff, teaching a
curriculum that takes into account the foreign officers’ diverse backgrounds and
letting them develop together where they would not be overwhelmed or at a dis-
advantage as they came to understand something of life not only in a foreign
country but in one so very different from their own.70 The result of this, Colbert
found, was a created bond. “Once one has become part of that special fraternity,”
he wrote, “neither time nor distance can dissolve the unique ties it forms among
its members.”71
These kinds of ties were the basis, he believed, for the kind of partnership
among nations that was urgently needed in the modern world. After the Second
World War, the United States responded to the urgent and practical needs of its
allies with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and other forms of assis-
tance. But these led to domination. With full economic recovery from the war,
these policies were no longer appropriate. “Domination leads to dependence,”
Colbert believed, “while true ‘partnership’ encourages the independence, pride
and dignity of our sovereign allies.”72
Further developing this idea, Colbert saw that there was an alternative to
previous U.S. foreign policy, one that encouraged and supported regional co-
operation and partnership in various areas. The growth of Soviet maritime
power presented a challenging problem “which no one country is able to re-
solve itself.”73 In this situation, Colbert saw many advantages in a policy and
strategy founded on partnership among allied and friendly nations. This could
best be achieved through multilateral naval forces designed for major regions of
the globe. The advantages of such forces were clear to him: the cost, financially
and politically, was low, and they avoided the internal political dissent caused by
massive or overwhelming commitment by the United States, while at the same
time increasing the effectiveness of such a force by being the symbolic and real
expression of several nations united in a common effort. Moreover, the general
maritime interests of the free world could be served by multilateral naval forces,
which could give rationale and justification for navies in countries where these
interests were under attack.74 In all of this Colbert clearly perceived the forms of
naval expertise that regional and small navies provided that complemented the
expertise within larger navies concentrating on global-scale naval operations.
In a career intertwined with ideas of international, naval cooperation, Rich-
ard Colbert sought to achieve four important objectives.75 First, he believed that
naval officers were particularly competent in solving international problems.
For navies, the sea is the same good friend or cruel foe all over the world. Because
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of this, naval officers have naturally developed a similar way of thinking and can
easily discuss mutual problems, apart from national prejudices. With this in
mind, Colbert sought out successful senior naval officers as responsible repre-
sentatives of different free-world societies and tried to motivate them to learn
through each other’s perspectives the value of freedom. He did this in the Naval
Command Course by creating an academic environment of mutual respect and
candor where the American political system and way of life, and those of each
country represented, were openly discussed.76
Second, through the International Seapower Symposium he sought to estab-
lish a forum where the highest naval leaders could exchange with their profes-
sional peers knowledge, concepts, views, and opinions about naval technology,
tactics, strategy, and the importance of sea power. Through this he hoped to fos-
ter deeper understanding and appreciation of different national perspectives.77
Third, in all his proposals for international cooperation, he hoped to establish
among naval officers a deeper awareness of the need for mutual reliance as a key
element in every nation’s national interest.
Fourth, he sought to establish rapport across cultural boundaries and to de-
velop personal knowledge and understanding for different national views as ex-
pressed by naval officers. In doing this, Colbert wanted to create a group of
knowledgeable naval leaders who could ensure that the effectiveness of multina-
tional forces would not be jeopardized by any failure to understand one’s own
ally.
Although Richard Colbert was an officer in the U.S. Navy, his vision was
clearly wider than the ordinary officer’s. His vision has certainly touched the of-
ficers and men of all ships who have served in the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic;
the senior flag officers who have attended the International Seapower Symposia;
and the faculty and students of the Naval War College.
In all of his objectives, the unifying theme is the mutual experience of the na-
val profession, which reaches beyond cultures and nations to establish its own
fraternity. Few naval officers have seen this vision so clearly as Richard Colbert,
and few have done so much to foster it. Those who would follow in his wake
must share his notion that no measure of international leadership can replace
trust and understanding among allies and a sound appreciation of common
goals.78
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